Responses to Registrants Questions Not Provided During January 21, 2010 WebCast on Indemnification Provisions
Question:
You mentioned that indemnification for the indemnitee's negligence will not be upheld (or only if explicit). Thus, is it unnecessary to carve that out in a provision, ie, saying we will indemnify you for product defects or our negligence, ""provided, however, that this indemnification obligation will not apply to the extent the damage, etc. is caused by the negligence of indemnitee.""
Response:
Please read my materials on public policy exceptions. As you will note various jurisdictions approach this issue in different ways. You should be able to check the law in the jurisdiction involved from the cites I provide. Please do advise me if you need further clarification after reviewing my materials - Unless you want to avoid focusing the other side's attention to the issue and are satisfied with the law in the particular jurisdiction you would probably want to be as articulate as you believe is consistent with your negotiating position. In fact you will probably want to include a good deal more in the exception then merely negligence - What about "acts or omissions" or "acts or omissions in breach of [name party]'s obligations under this agreement" or similar language ?
Additional Materials for January 21, 2010 Webcast and Re-Casting on May 24, 2010
Sandbagging
There is a fairly high probability that at attempt at sandbagging will not be successful and the possibility exists that an attempt at sandbagging may result in the loss of an advantageous business opportunity and possibly even expose the attempted sandbagger to contractual or tort damage claims. An examination of the effectiveness or intricacies of the various approaches that may be made by a prospective victim to counter an attempted sandbagging is beyond the scope of these materials. Such approaches include asserting claims for economic duress, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of a state fair business practices act that is applicable to business transactions. Local law may also require (absent an effective contract provision to the contrary) proof of reliance to establish a claim or defense based on breach by a seller of a warranty.
In the
Ziff-Davis
case the Court
of Appeals of New York held that the express warranties in
an agreement for the sale of twelve magazines for
$365,500,000 were bargained for terms of the contract and
that therefore were enforceable although the purchaser had
expressed doubt as to their truthfulness after the signing
of the agreement but before the closing. The Court of
Appeals framed the “ central question” of the case to be
whether the failure to plead reliance is fatal to the
purchaser’s claim for breach of express warranties. The
opinion then indicated that in a court’s analysis of a
claim for breach of an express warranty the critical
question is not whether the buyer believed in the truth of
the warranted information, but whether the buyer believed
it was purchasing the seller's promise as to its truth of
the warranted information and that to establish the claim
no more is required in the way of reliance than reliance on
the express warranty as being a part of the bargain between
the parties. The opinion observes that this approach
reflects the prevailing perception of an action for breach
of express warranty as one that is no grounded in contract
law and not tort law. Under this approach
“Once
the express warranty is shown to have been relied on as
part of the contract, the right to be indemnified in
damages for its breach does not depend on proof that the
buyer thereafter believed that the assurances of fact made
in the warranty would be fulfilled. The right to
indemnification depends only on establishing that the
warranty was breached.”
The following facts as described by the majority opinion of
the Court of Appeals reflect a somewhat standard scenario
in these situations
“In a January
31, 1985 letter, CBS wrote Ziff-Davis that,’[b]ased on the
information and analysis provided [to it, CBS was] of the
view that there [were] material misrepresentations in the
financial statements provided [to CBS] by Touche Ross &
Co., Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Ziff-Davis’. In response
to this letter, Ziff-Davis advised CBS by letter dated
February 4, 1985 that it ‘believe[d] that all conditions to
the closing * * * were fulfilled”, that “there [was] no
merit to the position taken by CBS in its [Jan. 31, 1985]
letter’ and that the financial statements were properly
prepared and fairly presented Ziff-Davis's financial
condition. It also warned CBS that, since all conditions to
closing were satisfied, closing was required to be held
that day, February 4, 1985, and that, if it ‘should fail to
consummate the transactions as provided * * * Ziff-Davis
intend[ed] to pursue all of its rights and remedies as
provided by law.’ (Emphasis added.)
“CBS responded to Ziff-Davis's February 4, 1985 letter with
its own February 4 letter, which Ziff-Davis accepted and
agreed to. In its February 4 letter, CBS acknowledged that
“a clear dispute” existed between the parties. It stated
that it had decided to proceed with the deal because it had
‘spent considerable time, effort and money in complying
with [its] obligations * * * and recogniz [ed] that
[Ziff-Davis had] considerably more information available’.
Accordingly, the parties agreed “to close [that day] on a
mutual understanding that the decision to close, and the
closing, [would] not constitute a waiver of any rights or
defenses either of us may have” (emphasis added) under the
purchase agreement. The deal was consummated on February 4.
“CBS then
brought this action claiming in its third cause of action
that Ziff-Davis had breached the warranties made as to the
magazines' profitability. Based on that breach, CBS alleged
that “the price bid and the price paid by CBS were in
excess of that which would have been bid and paid by CBS
had Ziff-Davis not breached its representation and
warranties.’
In an Indiana case, although the provision was not well drafted, the court depended on such provision in holding that a purchaser could not rely on a warranty in a business sale agreement since the purchaser had knowledge of the falsity of the warranty at the time of signing of the agreement.
In Telephia v. Cuppy the agreement for the sale of technology provided that “[n]o information or knowledge obtained in any investigation pursuant to [a specified section of the contract] shall affect or be deemed to modify any representation or warranty contained in this Agreement....” while another provision of the same agreement provided that “No investigation made by or on behalf of the Company [Telephia] with respect to [specified issues] shall be deemed to affect the Company Affiliates' ... reliance on the representations, warranties, covenants, and agreements made by [the seller].” The Court concluded that “this contractual language is clear, and that defendants may be held accountable to the warranties in the SPA regardless of plaintiff's reliance on those warranties. The Court then observed that “Although defendants argue that it would be ‘condoning a fraud’ to allow Telephia to enforce warranties that it knew to be false, the Court finds it no stranger a result than to interpret the SPA in a manner that results in Telephia having insisted on toothless provisions.”
If the buyer decides not to close it may be ultimately determined by a fact finder that the facts underlying the warranty were not in fact materially false or that the breach of the warranty was not material to the transaction. If the buyer closes such action might constitute a waver of the seller’s breach. If the buyer deems the value of the transaction to exceed the adverse impact of the seller’s apparent breach of the warranty the buyer may have to swallow hard, attempt to close under a reservation of right and proceed to close as on balance this is a better approach then refusing to close even if in reality there is no issue as to the breach and its materiality.
A buyer may avoid being thrust on the horns of this dilemma by including in a purchase agreement a provision permitting the buyer to close on the transaction with a reservation of right to asset a claim for damages for any loss arising from the alleged breach by the seller of a warranty or failure of specified conditions to closing having occurred. Such a provision must be tailored to each transaction with particular concern for the definitions of terms such as “material” and “loss”